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Abstract
We study the problem of characterizing revenue optimal auctions for single-minded buyers.
Each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle of items and has a value for the same. Both
his bundle and its value are his private information. The bundles that buyers are interested in
and their corresponding values are assumed to be realized from known probability distributions
independent across the buyers. We identify revenue optimal auctions with a simple structure,
if the conditional distribution of any buyer’s valuation is nondecreasing, in the hazard rates
ordering of probability distributions, as a function of the bundle the buyer is interested in. The
revenue optimal auction is given by the solution of a maximum weight independent set problem.
We provide a novel graphical construction of the weights and highlight important properties of
the resulting auction.
1 Introduction
Consider N buyers competing for a certain set of items offered by a seller. A buyer has a value
for each combination of the items (henceforth referred to as a bundle) that he is interested in.
This is the maximum price that he is willing to pay for the bundle. The seller’s objective is to
maximize his revenue from the sale. If the seller knew these values exactly, he could maximize his
revenue by simply finding an allocation of the items among the buyers that has the maximum total
value, and charging each buyer the exact value of the bundle allocated to him. However, the values
that the buyers have for different bundles are their private information; the seller has imperfect
information about these values. The seller’s task is complicated further by the strategic behavior of
the buyers; a buyer might misreport the values of the bundles he is interested in, if it is beneficial
for him to do so. Combinatorial auctions (henceforth CAs) offer a solution. CAs allow buyers the
freedom to compete for any bundle of items and provide them incentives to report their private
values truthfully. The allocation and the payments are determined by the competition among the
buyers. However, the inherent problems of CAs limit their appeal.
Often there are complementarities among the items - a buyer can have a higher value for
a bundle as a whole than the sum of values of the parts of the bundle. Different buyers may
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have different forms of complementarity. Because of complementarity, allocation of items in a CA
requires solving a hard combinatorial optimization problem; a naive implementation can lead to the
exposure problem for the winners - a winner might end up getting only a part of his desired bundle,
while still paying a high price for it. Moreover, the goal of revenue maximization (referred to as
optimality) is very different from the much studied goal of social welfare maximization (referred to
as efficiency) in auction theory, e.g., the VCG mechanism [1, 2, 3]. Theoretical results on revenue
maximization are known only under simple settings, e.g., [4, 5, 6]. Characterizing revenue optimal
CAs in full generality with multiple buyers, multiple items, and different values for the different
bundles, still remains a challenging open problem, even if the complexity considerations are ignored.
This paper aims to address the issues of (1) dealing with complementarity, and (2) maximizing
revenue, for CAs. The key to designing CAs with desirable properties is to understand and handle
complementarity among the items. An extreme case of complementarity is when buyers are single
minded [7]. Here, each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle and has a value for the same.
Any allocation of items to a buyer that does not contain his desired bundle has zero value for
him. Both the bundle that a buyer is interested in and its value are his private information. CA
problems with single-minded buyers are more tractable than if buyers have general valuations.
While the single-minded buyers model might appear as a simplifying assumption, no general result
on revenue maximization is known even for this extreme case. Here a buyer has two dimensions
for misreporting his preference - the bundle he is interested in, and the value of the bundle. Most
of the existing literature on revenue optimal auctions studies problems which are one dimensional
- a buyer has only one real number for misreporting his preference, e.g., Myerson’s single item
auction [4], the single-parameter buyers model described in [5], and single-minded buyers with
known bundles1 [8]. Thus, the single-minded buyer model can be thought of as an initial step
towards solving the general CA problems. Also, see [7] for some real examples where buyers are
single minded. Hence, we focus on the CAs with single-minded buyers.
In addition, we take a departure from the continuous variable models of economics and assume
that the set of possible values that a buyer can have for his bundle is finite. While working with
finite valuation sets is clearly relevant from the implementation point of view, it is interesting in its
own right; e.g., we show later in this paper that the revenue equivalence result of [4] does not hold
true when the valuation sets are finite. A related work was done by [9] where a Bayesian optimal
auction, when buyers’ valuation sets are finite, is characterized. However, [9] deals only with single
item auctions.
We make the following contributions in this paper. We modify and extend the framework of [9]
for multiple item auctions with single-minded buyers. We then find a sufficient condition under
which a revenue optimal auction can be characterized for single-minded buyers. This sufficient
condition is the monotonicity of the conditional distribution of any buyer’s valuation, in the hazard
rate ordering, as a function of the bundle the buyer is interested in. An interpretation of this
condition is as follows: if there are two bundles where one contains the other, then the larger
bundle is likely to have a higher value. Such monotonicity property is intuitive for single-minded
buyers. Such monotonicity property is intuitive for single-minded buyers. A similar hazard rate
ordering condition appears in [10] in the context of dynamic knapsack problem. However, [10] (as
well as [8]) assumes that the distributions also satisfy Myerson’s nonintuitive regularity assumption
[4]. An important contribution of our paper is to show that such assumption is unnecessary. We
present an algorithm for optimal auction as a solution of a maximum weight independent set
1Single-minded buyers with known bundles is also an instance of the single-parameter buyers.
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problem, where weights are an appropriate mapping of buyers’ valuations, called virtual valuations.
We also provide a novel graphical construction of the virtual valuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our model, definitions, and
notation. Section 3 characterizes an optimal auction for single-minded buyers, while Section 4
describes some of its important properties. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model and Notation
Consider N buyers competing for S items that a seller wants to sell. The set of buyers is denoted
by N , {1, 2, . . . , N}, and the set of items for sale is denoted by S. Buyers are single minded - each
buyer n is interested only in a specific bundle b∗n ∈ 2S and has a value v∗n for any bundle bn such that
bn ⊇ b∗n, while he has zero value for any other bundle. Here 2S denotes the power set of S. Notice
that single-minded buyers enjoy free disposal of the items. We refer to the tuple (b∗n, v
∗
n) as the type
of buyer n. The type of a buyer is known only to him and constitutes his private information.
For each buyer n, the seller and the other buyers have imperfect information about his type;
they describe the bundle that buyer n is interested in by a random set Bn, and its value by
a discrete random variable Xn. The random set Bn takes values from the collection Bn ⊆ 2S ,
where Bn is the collection of all bundles that buyer n can possibly be interested in. The random
variable Xn is assumed to take values from the set Xn , {x1n, x2n, . . . , xKnn } of cardinality Kn,
where 0 ≤ x1n < x2n < . . . < xKnn . The joint probability distribution of Bn and Xn is common
knowledge. The probability that Bn = bn is denoted by p(bn), and conditioned on Bn = bn,
the probability that Xn is equal to x
i
n is denoted by p(x
i
n|bn); i.e., p(bn) , P [Bn = bn], and
p(xin|bn) , P
[
Xn = x
i
n|Bn = bn
]
. Assume that p(bn) > 0 and p(x
i
n|bn) > 0 for all n ∈ N , bn ∈ Bn,
and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn. Note that (b∗n, v∗n) can be interpreted as a specific realization of the random
variables (Bn,Xn). Let Yn , (Bn,Xn) be the random vector describing the type of buyer n.
Random vectors [Yn]n∈N are assumed to be independent
2.
Denote a typical reported type (henceforth referred to as a bid) of a buyer n by (bn, vn), where
bn ∈ Bn and vn ∈ Xn. Define the vector of bids as (b,v), where b , (b1, b2, . . . , bN ) is the vector
of reported bundles, and v , (v1, v2, . . . , vN ) is the vector of reported values. The seller can
only allocate the items to a set of buyers whose reported bundles are disjoint. Given a vector of
bundles b, define A(b) as follows:
A(b) , {A ⊆ N : ∀n,m ∈ A, n 6= m, bn ∩ bm = ∅}. (1)
This is the collection of all feasible allocations; i.e., the collection of all subsets of buyers who can
be allocated their respective bundles simultaneously. Trivially, ∅ ∈ A(b) and A(b) is downward
closed ; i.e., if A ∈ A(b) and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ A(b).
Define B , (B1, B2, . . . , BN ), X , (X1,X2, . . . ,XN ), and Y , (Y1, Y2, . . . , YN ). We use Y and
(B,X) interchangeably. Let B , B1 × B2 × . . . × BN and X , X1 × X2 × . . . × XN . We use the
standard game theoretic notation of v−n , (v1, . . . , vn−1, vn+1, . . . , vN ) and v , (vn,v−n). Similar
interpretations are used for b−n, B−n, X−n, Y−n, B−n, and X−n. Henceforth, in any further
usage, bn, b−n, and b are always in the sets Bn, B−n, and B respectively; and vn, v−n, and v are
always in the sets Xn, X−n, and X respectively.
2This is referred to as the independent private value model. It is a fairly standard model in auction theory.
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3 Revenue Optimal Auction
In this section, we formally describe the optimal auction problem, formulate the objective and the
constraints explicitly, and provide an optimal algorithm for solving the problem. We will be focusing
only on the auction mechanisms where buyers are asked to report their types directly (referred to as
direct mechanism). By the revelation principle3 [4], the restriction to direct mechanisms is without
any loss of optimality.
3.1 Characterization
An auction mechanism is specified by an allocation rule pi : B×X 7→ [0, 1]2N , and a payment rule
M : B × X 7→ RN . Given a bid vector (b,v), the allocation rule pi(b,v) , [piA(b,v)]A∈2N is a
probability distribution over the power set 2N of N . For each A ∈ 2N , piA(b,v) is the probability
that the set of buyers A get their reported bundles simultaneously. The payment rule is defined
as M , (M1,M2, . . . ,MN ), where Mn(b,v) is the payment (expected payment in case of random
allocation) that buyer n makes to the seller when the bid vector is (b,v). Let Qn(b,v) be the
probability that buyer n gets his reported bundle bn when the bid vector is (b,v); i.e,
Qn(b,v) ,
∑
A∈2N :n∈A
piA(b,v). (2)
Given that the type of a buyer n is (b∗n, v
∗
n), and the bid vector is (b,v), the payoff (expected
payoff in case of random allocation) of the buyer n is:
σn(b,v; b
∗
n, v
∗
n) , Qn(b,v)1{b∗n⊆bn}v
∗
n −Mn(b,v). (3)
So buyers are assumed to be risk neutral and have quasilinear payoffs (a standard assumption
in auction theory). The mechanism (pi,M) and the payoff functions [σn]n∈N induce a game of
incomplete information among the buyers. We use Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) as the solution
concept. The seller’s goal is to design an auction mechanism (pi,M) to maximize his expected
revenue at a BNE of the induced game. Again, using the revelation principle, seller can restrict
only to the auctions where truth-telling is a BNE (referred to as incentive compatibility) without
any loss of optimality.
For the above revenue maximization problem to be well defined, assume that the seller cannot
force the buyers to participate in an auction and impose arbitrarily high payments on them. Thus,
a buyer will voluntarily participate in an auction only if his payoff from participation is nonnegative
(referred to as individual rationality). In addition, the auction mechanism that the seller uses must
always produce feasible allocations; i.e., for any bid vector, the set of winners must have disjoint
bundles. The seller too is assumed to have free disposal of the items and may decide not to sell
some or all items for certain bid vectors.
The idea now, as in [4], is to express incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and feasible
allocations as mathematical constraints, and formulate the revenue maximization objective as an
optimization problem under these constraints. To this end, for each n ∈ N , bn, and vn, define the
following functions:
qn(bn, vn) , E [Qn(bn, vn,Y−n)] , (4)
3Revelation principle says that, given a mechanism and a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) for that mechanism,
there exists a direct mechanism in which truth-telling is a BNE, and allocation and payment outcomes are same as
in the given BNE of the original mechanism.
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mn(bn, vn) , E [Mn(bn, vn,Y−n)] , (5)
Here, qn(bn, vn) is the expected probability that buyer n gets his bundle given that he reports his
type as (bn, vn) while everyone else is truthful. The expectation here is over the type of everyone
else; i.e., over Y−n. Similarly, mn(bn, vn) is the expected payment that buyer n makes to the seller.
The constraints can be expressed mathematically as follows
1. Feasible allocation (FA): For any b and v,
A /∈ A (b)⇒ piA(b,v) = 0. (6)
2. Incentive compatibility (IC): For any n ∈ N , bn, t ∈ Bn, and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Kn,
qn(bn, x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(bn, xin) ≥ qn(t, xjn)1{bn⊆t}xin −mn(t, xjn). (7)
Notice that, given Bn = bn, and Xn = x
i
n, the left side of (7) is the payoff of buyer n from
reporting his type truthfully, assuming everyone else is also truthful, while the right side is
the payoff from misreporting his type to (t, xjn).
3. Individual rationality (IR): For any n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn,
qn(bn, x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(bn, xin) ≥ 0. (8)
Under IC, all buyers report their true types. Hence, the expected revenue that the seller gets
is E
[∑N
n=1Mn(Y)
]
. The expectation here is over the distribution of the random vector Y. Thus,
the seller’s optimization problem is given by:
Optimal auction problem (OAP)
maximize
pi,M
E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(Y)
]
,
subject to FA, IC, and IR constraints.
(9)
Instead of solving the OAP, we solve a modified problem obtained by relaxing the IC constraint.
We then find a sufficient condition under which the solution of the modified problem is also the
solution of OAP. The relaxed IC constraint is obtained by assuming that buyers report their bundles
truthfully, or equivalently, the bundles that the buyers are interested in are known to everyone.
Mathematically, the relaxed IC constraint is:
qn(bn, x
i
n)x
i
n −mn(bn, xin) ≥ qn(bn, xjn)xin −mn(bn, xjn), (10)
for any n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Kn. The modified optimization problem is given by:
Modified optimal auction problem (MOAP)
maximize
pi,M
E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(Y)
]
,
subject to FA, relaxed IC (10), and IR constraints.
(11)
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For the MOAP, using the relaxed IC constraint (10) and the IR constraint (8), we relate the
expected payment mn of a buyer n to his expected allocation probability qn. The framework used
is similar to [9]. We first define the virtual-valuation function, wn, of buyer n as:
wn(bn, x
i
n) ,

 x
i
n − (xi+1n − xin)
(∑Kn
j=i+1 p(x
j
n|bn)
)
p(xin|bn)
if 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1,
xKnn if i = Kn.
(12)
Definition 1. The virtual-valuation function wn is said to be regular if wn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ wn(bn, xi+1n )
for all bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
Proposition 1. Let pi be an allocation rule and [Qn]n∈N and [qn]n∈N be obtained from pi by (2)
and (4). A payment rule satisfying the relaxed IC constraint (10) and the IR constraint (8) exists
for pi if and only if qn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ qn(bn, xi+1n ) for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Given such pi
and a payment rule M satisfying the IC and IR constraints, the seller’s revenue satisfies:
Seller’s revenue = E
[
N∑
n=1
Mn(Y)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(Y)wn(Yn)
]
. (13)
Moreover, a payment rule M achieving this bound exists and any such M satisfies:
mn(bn, x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
(qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n ))xjn,
for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, where we use the notational convention qn(bn, x0n) , 0.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
3.2 Solution of the MOAP
We now describe an algorithm for finding a solution of the MOAP. As mentioned in Section 1, this
is related to [5], [8], and [9].
From (2), for all bn and vn, we have:
N∑
n=1
Qn(b,v)wn(bn, vn) =
∑
A∈2N
piA(b,v)
(∑
n∈A
wn(bn, vn)
)
. (14)
Proposition 1 and (14) suggest that a solution of the MOAP can be found by selecting the allocation
rule pi that assigns nonzero probabilities only to the set of buyers in A(b) with the maximum total
virtual valuations for each bid vector (b,v). If all wn’s are regular, then it can be verified that
such an allocation rule satisfies the monotonicity condition on the qn’s needed by Proposition 1.
However, if wn’s are not regular, the resulting allocation rule would not necessarily satisfy the
required monotonicity condition on the qn’s. This problem can be remedied by using another
function, wn, called the monotone virtual valuation (henceforth MVV), constructed graphically as
follows.
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For all n ∈ N , bn, and 0 ≤ i ≤ Kn, define:
(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n ) ,
( i∑
j=1
p(xjn|bn),−xi+1n
( Kn∑
j=i+1
p(xjn|bn)
))
, (15)
where we use the notational convention of
∑0
j=1(.) , 0, x
Kn+1
n , 0, and
∑Kn
j=Kn+1
(.) , 0. Then,
wn(bn, x
i
n) is given by the slope of the line joining the point (g
bn,i−1
n , h
bn,i−1
n ) to the point (g
bn,i
n , h
bn,i
n );
i.e.,
wn(bn, x
i
n) =
hbn,in − hbn,i−1n
gbn,in − gbn,i−1n
. (16)
Find the lower convex hull of the points [(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn . Let h
bn,i
n be the point on this convex
hull corresponding to gbn,in . Then, wn(bn, x
i
n) is defined as the slope of the line joining the point
(gbn,i−1n , h
bn,i−1
n ) to the point (g
bn,i
n , h
bn,i
n ); i.e.,
wn(bn, x
i
n) =
h
bn,i
n − hbn,i−1n
gbn,in − gbn,i−1n
. (17)
To find the points [(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn graphically, draw vertical lines separated from each other
by distances p(x1n|bn), p(x2n|bn), . . . , p(xKnn |bn). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, join the point −xi on the
y-axis to the x-axis at 1 (sum of probabilities) and call such line as line i. The intersection of line
1 with y-axis is the point (gbn,0n , h
bn,0
n ). The intersection of line 2 with the first vertical line is the
point (gbn,1n , h
bn,1
n ). Similarly, the intersection of the line 3 with the second vertical line is the point
(gbn,2n , h
bn,2
n ), and so on. Notice that if wn is regular, wn is equal to wn.
Figure 1(a) shows this construction for a typical random variable X taking four different values
{x1, x2, x3, x4} with corresponding probabilities {p1, p2, p3, p4}, where we have dropped the sub-
scripts corresponding to the buyers and the bundle information for the ease of notation. This is the
case of virtual valuation being regular. Since the slopes of the graph are nondecreasing, the function
graphed is convex. In Figure 1(b), w(x1) > w(x2), and hence, the virtual-valuation function is not
regular. Here, the the lower convex hull of the points (gi, hi)’s is taken. The slopes of individual
segments of this convex hull give the MVV function w. This is equivalent to replacing w(x1) and
w(x2) by their weighted mean; i.e., w(x1) = w(x2) = (p1w(x1) + p2w(x2))/(p1 + p2).
The following lemma that is a straightforward consequence of the construction of wn as the
slopes of a convex function:
Lemma 1. wn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ wn(bn, xi+1n ) for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
The next proposition establishes the significance of the allocation rule obtained by using wn’s.
Proposition 2. Given any allocation rule pi such that [Qn]n∈N and [qn]n∈N , obtained from pi by
(2) and (4), satisfy qn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ qn(bn, xi+1n ), for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Then,
E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(Y)wn(Yn)
]
≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
Qn(Y)wn(Yn)
]
. (18)
Moreover, (18) holds with equality for any allocation rule that maximizes
∑N
n=1Qn(b,v)wn(bn, vn)
for each bid vector (b,v), subject to the FA constraint.
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Proof. The proof appears in Appendix B. The proof is a straightforward extension of [9] where a
similar result is obtained for single item auctions.
The maximum weight algorithm (henceforth MWA) for the MOAP is described in Algorithm 1.
The setW(b,v) is the collection of all feasible subsets of buyers with maximum total MVVs for the
given bid vector (b,v). Since A (b) is downward closed and ∅ ∈ A (b), no buyer n with wn(bn, vn) <
0 is included in the set of winnersW (b,v). In step 3 of the MWA, for each xin ≤ vn, Qn(b, xin,v−n)
is computed recursively by treating (b, xin,v−n) as the input bid vector and repeating steps 1− 2.
Algorithm 1 Maximum weight algorithm (MWA)
Given a bid vector (b,v):
1. Compute wn(bn, vn) for each n ∈ N .
2. Take pi(b,v) to be any probability distribution on the collection W(b,v) defined as:
W(b,v) , argmax
A∈A (b)
∑
n∈A
wn(bn, vn).
Obtain the set of winners W (b,v) by sampling from W(b,v) according to pi(b,v).
3. Collect payments given by:
Mn(b,v) =
∑
i:xin≤vn
(
Qn(b, x
i
n,v−n)−Qn(b, xi−1n ,v−n)
)
xin,
where Qn is given by (2), and Qn(b, x
0
n,v−n) , 0.
Proposition 3. The MWA gives a solution of the MOAP.
Proof. Let (pio,Mo) be the solution given by the MWA and let [Qon]n∈N and [q
o
n]n∈N be obtained
from pio by (2) and (4). Since W(b,v) ⊆ A (b), (pio,Mo) satisfy the FA constraint.
From Lemma 1, wn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ wn(bn, xi+1n ). Hence, for any (b−n,v−n), if A ∈ W(b, xin,v−n) and
n ∈ A, then from step 2 of the MWA4, A ∈ W(b, xi+1n ,v−n). This in turn implies Qon(b, xin,v−n) ≤
Qon(b, x
i+1
n ,v−n) and q
o
n(bn, x
i
n) ≤ qon(bn, xi+1n ). Thus, monotonicity condition of Proposition 1 is
satisfied and Mo is optimal given pio.
Similar to (2), for all bn and vn, we have:
N∑
n=1
Qon(b,v)wn(bn, vn) =
∑
A∈2N
pioA(b,v)
(∑
n∈A
wn(bn, vn)
)
.
Thus, pio maximizes
∑N
n=1Qn(b,v)wn(bn, vn) for each bid vector (b,v), subject to the FA con-
straint. Proposition 2 then completes the proof.
4The allocation rule pio must be consistent in the following sense: let vn and vˆn be such that vn < vˆn, but
wn(bn, vn) = wn(bn, vˆn), then P [n ∈W (b, vn,v−n)] ≤ P [n ∈W (b, vˆn,v−n)] for any b and v−n.
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The MWA can be interpreted as follows. Given a bid vector (b,v), construct a graph Gb(N , E)
with a node n for each buyer n, and an edge en,m ∈ E if bn ∩ bm 6= ∅. Thus, Gb is the conflict graph
of the buyers, where an edge denotes that buyers corresponding to its endpoints cannot be allocated
their bundles simultaneously. The collection of all independent sets of this graph is precisely A (b).
Let wn(bn, vn) be the weight of node n. Then the set of winners W (b,v) is a maximum weight
independent set of this graph.
In the subsequent discussion, we will be using the MWA with a deterministic tie-breaking rule
(henceforth deterministic MWA). Here, in step 2 of the MWA, the set of winnersW (b,v) ∈ W(b,v)
is selected by a deterministic rule. For example, the set of winnersW (b,v) can be the first allocation
set in W(b,v) under the lexicographic order defined over the set of all allocations 2N .
Let (pio,Mo) be the solution given by the deterministic MWA. Then Qon(b,v) ∈ {0, 1} for all
n ∈ N , b, and v. Also, from the proof of Proposition 3, Qon(b,v) is nondecreasing in vn, keeping b
and v−n constant. This, along with the payment rule in step 3 of MWA, implies that a winner
pays the price that is the minimum value he needs to report to still win, keeping his bundle and
the bids of everyone else fixed.
3.3 Solution of the OAP
We now give a sufficient condition under which a solution of MOAP is also the solution of OAP.
To this end, define the hazard rate ordering [11] on two random variables as follows:
Definition 2. A nonnegative random variable Z1 is said to be smaller than a nonnegative random
variable Z2 under the hazard rate order, denoted by Z1 ≤h Z2, if Z1 and Z2 have the same support,
and
P [Z1 > z|Z1 > zˆ] ≤ P [Z2 > z|Z2 > zˆ] , (19)
for all z, zˆ such that z ≥ zˆ, and z, zˆ are in the common support of Z1 and Z2.
Notice that, if Z1 ≤h Z2, then Z1 is also smaller than Z2 under the first order stochastic
dominance (FOSD) [11]. In the FOSD, (19) is replaced by simply P [Z1 > z] ≤ P [Z2 > z] for all z
in the common support of Z1 and Z2. Hence, the hazard rate order is stricter than the FOSD.
It is natural to expect that if there are two bundles where one contains the other, then the
larger bundle is likely to have a higher value. This is precisely captured by Assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1. For any s, t ∈ Bn with s ⊆ t, the conditional random variable (Xn|Bn = s) is
smaller than the conditional random variable (Xn|Bn = t) under the hazard rate order. Equiva-
lently, for all n ∈ N , s, t ∈ Bn such that s ⊆ t, and 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ Kn,∑Kn
l=i p(x
l
n|s)∑Kn
l=j p(x
l
n|s)
≤
∑Kn
l=i p(x
l
n|t)∑Kn
l=j p(x
l
n|t)
. (20)
Propositions 4 and 5 below describe the main results of this paper.
Proposition 4. Let s, t ∈ Bn be such that s ⊆ t. Then under Assumption 1, wn(s, xin) ≥ wn(t, xin)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 5. A deterministic MWA gives a solution of the OAP under Assumption 1.
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Proof. Notice that OAP and MOAP differ only in their constraints, and the relaxed IC constraint
(10) is a subset of the IC constraint (7). Hence, we only need to verify that the solution given by
the deterministic MWA satisfies the IC constraint. We show that, under the deterministic MWA,
the truthful declaration of the types is a weakly dominant strategy for the buyers.
Let the bid vector be (b,v). Based on the reported bundles b, the conflict graph Gb is con-
structed. The weights of the nodes of Gb are the MVVs for the bid vector (b,v). Consider a
buyer n. Let his true type be (b∗n, v
∗
n). Since buyers are single minded, it can be assumed that
bn ⊇ b∗n, otherwise the payoff from misreporting a bundle can be at most zero, which is less than or
equal to the payoff from reporting the bundle truthfully. Also, if buyer n does not get his bundle by
bidding (bn, vn) (and hence payoff equal to zero) then truthful bidding (payoff at least zero) cannot
be worse. Hence, we only need to analyze the case where buyer n wins by bidding (bn, vn) such
that bn ⊇ b∗n. Since buyer n is a winner, there is a maximum weight independent set (henceforth
MWIS) in Gb that contains node n. Because of a deterministic tie-breaking rule, buyer n pays the
minimum value he needs to report to win. This is his value xin at which the value of the MWIS
containing node n exceeds the value of all MWIS not containing node n. Now, if instead buyer n
reports b∗n, it can result in deletion of some edges incident on node n in Gb, but cannot add any
new edge. At the same time, from Proposition 4, the weight of node n (or the MVV of buyer n)
can possibly increase but cannot decrease. Hence, the value of the MWIS containing node n can
possibly go up but cannot decrease, while the value of the MWIS not containing node n does not
change. Buyer n still wins and the payment if he declares (b∗n, vn) cannot be more than what
he pays when he declares (bn, vn). Thus, truthful reporting of the bundle is a weakly dominant
strategy.
We can now assume that buyer n reports his bundle b∗n truthfully. Since the price that he pays
only depends on his reported bundle and the bids of everyone else, but not on his reported value,
truthful reporting of the value is a weakly dominant strategy. This completes the proof.
4 Discussion
In this section, we highlight some of the important properties of the optimal auction characterized
in Section 3.
(a) Some special cases: A special case of interest is when the bundle that a buyer is interested
in is known to everyone. This is equivalent to Bn containing only one bundle. Here, OAP and
MOAP are identical. More generally, if Bn is such that no bundle in Bn is a superset of another
bundle in Bn, then a buyer will report his bundle truthfully, and hence OAP and MOAP are
identical. If Bn and Xn are independent then Assumption 2 trivially holds true. In all these
cases, an optimal auction is given by the deterministic MWA.
Auctions with identical items can be thought of as single minded buyers with substitutes and
is closely related to the case with known bundles. Here, the seller has κ identical items for sale.
A buyer is interested in any one of the κ items. The analysis of Section 3 is easily extended to
this case by simply defining the collection of feasible allocations as:
Aκ , {A : A ⊆ N , |A| ≤ κ}.
This is the collection of all subsets of N with cardinality less than or equal to κ. The optimal
auction is given by the MWA with A (b) replaced by Aκ.
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(b) Continuous OAP: The results of this paper easily extend to the continuous version of the
OAP where buyers’ valuation sets are continuous. Here, Xn is a nonnegative interval of R, and
the random variable Xn is specified by the probability density function (pdf) fXn(x) > 0 for
all x ∈ Xn. Let FXn(x) be the corresponding cumulative distribution (CDF) function. Denote
the conditional pdf and conditional CDF of Xn, given Bn = bn, by fXn|bn(x) and FXn|bn(x)
respectively. Then the MWA again gives the solution of the continuous OAP after the following
modifications:
wn(bn, vn) = vn −
1− FXn|bn(vn)
fXn|bn(vn)
,
Mn(b,v) = Qn(b,v)vn −
∫ vn
0
Qn(b, x,v−n)dx.
The continuous OAP, however, has one key difference from the discrete OAP. In the contin-
uous case, given an allocation rule pi, under the IC and relaxed IR constraints, the expected
payment that a buyer makes is determined up to an additive constant (the revenue equivalence
principle of [4]); i.e., mn(bn, vn)−mn(bn, 0) is a known function of vn. However, in the discrete
case, mn(bn, x
i
n) −mn(bn, 0) is fixed to within an interval of values. The expected revenue is
maximized by taking the upper value of this interval, and the optimal auction in Section 3 is
characterized this way.
(c) Reserve prices: Given a bid vector (b,v), no buyer n with wn(bn, vn) < 0 is included in
the set of winners, W (b,v), by the MWA. Depending on the tie-breaking rule, a buyer n with
wn(bn, vn) = 0 may or may not be included in the set of winners. Assume that only buyers
with wn(bn, vn) > 0 are considered. Since wn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ wn(bn, xi+1n ), the seller equivalently
sets reserve prices for each buyer n and does not sell any item to a buyer if his reported value
is less than his reserve price. The reserve price for a buyer depends only on the probability
distribution of his valuations, conditioned on his bundle, and might be different for different
buyers. Let rn(bn) be the reserve price for a buyer n as a function of his bundle. If x
k
n =
rn(bn), then wn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. As wn(bn, xi)’s are the slopes of the lines
joining the points (gbn,in , h
bn,i
n ), we get h
bn,k−1
n = min0≤i≤Kn h
bn,i
n . From the property of convex
hull, min0≤i≤Kn h
bn,i
n = min0≤i≤Kn h
bn,i
n . Thus, using the definition of h
bn,i
n ’s, an equivalent
formulation of the reserve price is:
rn(bn) = max
{
vn : vn ∈ argmax
vˆn∈Xn
vˆnP [Xn ≥ vˆn|Bn = bn]
}
. (21)
Graphically, this corresponds to the y-intercept of the line through the lowermost point of the
graph and the point (1, 0) (x3 in Figures 1(a) and 1(b)).
(d) Implementation complexity: The optimal allocation rule for auctions with single-minded
buyers requires finding a maximum weight independent set in the conflict graph. This problem
is NP-hard. However, similar to [7], a greedy scheme can be obtained that is easy to implement,
and achieves
√
S approximation5 of the revenue generated by the deterministic MWA. The
greedy scheme allocates the bundles to the buyers according to the order induced by the
5Any approximation better than
√
S is again NP-Hard.
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normalized virtual valuations wn(bn, vn)/
√|bn|. The price charged to a buyer who gets his
desired bundle is the minimum value he needs to report to still win, keeping his bundle and
the bids of everyone else fixed.
(e) On the hazard rate order assumption: In the absence of Assumption 1, the solution
given by the MWA (under any tie-breaking rule) need not satisfy the IC constraint. The fol-
lowing example shows this. Consider two buyers {1, 2} and two items {A,B}. Buyer 1 is
interested in bundle {A} and has value $1 for it. Buyer 2 can be interested in bundle {A} or
bundle {A,B}, each with probability 1/2. Conditioned on buyer 2 being interested in bun-
dle {A}, his values can be $2 or $4, each with probability 1/2. Conditioned on him being
interested in bundle {A,B}, his values can be $2 or $4, with probabilities 0.9 and 0.1 respec-
tively. Clearly, Assumption 1 does not hold true for buyer 2. The virtual-valuation function for
buyer 1 is w1({A}, $1) = $1. For buyer 2, the virtual-valuation function is w2({A}, $2) = $0,
w2({A}, $4) = $4, w2({A,B}, $2) = $16/9, and w2({A,B}, $2) = $4. Under the MWA, if
buyer 2 bids ({A}, $2) he loses, and if he bids ({A}, $4) then he gets bundle {A} at the price
$4. However, if buyer 2 bids ({A,B}, $2) or ({A,B}, $4) then he gets bundle {A,B} at the
price $2. Thus, if the true type of buyer 2 is ({A}, $4), he will misreport it to ({A,B}, $2) or
({A,B}, $4).
5 Conclusions
We characterized a Bayesian revenue optimal multiple items auction with single-minded buyers
under a partial hazard rate order assumption on the conditional distribution of any buyer’s valu-
ation. This assumption is intuitive for single-minded buyers and imply that the larger bundle is
likely to have higher value. The resulting auction has a simple structure - the set of winners are the
maximum weight independent set of the conflict graph of the buyers, and the payment made by a
winner is the minimum value he needs to report to win. Single-minded buyers have two dimensional
private information. The contributions here provide a step towards understanding optimal auction
problems where buyers’ private information is multidimensional.
A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 follows from the lemmas given below.
Lemma 2. Under the relaxed IC constraint (10), qn(bn, x
i
n) ≤ qn(bn, xi+1n ) for all n ∈ N , bn, and
1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
Proof. The proof follows easily from (10) by considering the case where the true value of the bundle
bn for buyer n is x
i
n but he reports x
i+1
n instead, and the case where the true value is x
i+1
n but he
reports xin instead.
Lemma 3. The relaxed IC constraint (10) is equivalent to:(
qn(bn, x
i+1
n )− qn(bn, xin)
)
xin ≤ mn(bn, xi+1n )−mn(bn, xin) ≤
(
qn(bn, x
i+1
n )− qn(bn, xin)
)
xi+1n , (22)
for all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1.
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Proof. Trivially, the relaxed IC constraint (10) implies (22). To show that (22) implies (7), first
consider the case j > i. Using (22),
(
qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xin)
)
xin ≤
j−1∑
k=i
[(
qn(bn, x
k+1
n )− qn(bn, xkn)
)
xkn
]
,
≤
j−1∑
k=i
[
mn(bn, x
k+1
n )−mn(bn, xkn)
]
,
= mn(bn, x
j
n)−mn(bn, xin),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2 and xkn < x
k+1
n . Thus, (10) holds for j < i.
Similarly, starting with the left inequality of (22), it can easily be shown that (22) implies (10) for
j < i, and the proof is complete.
Lemma 4. Under the relaxed IC constraint (10) and the IR constraint (8), for all n ∈ N and bn,
the following holds:
E [mn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] ≤ E [qn(bn,Xn)wn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] . (23)
Moreover, (23) holds with equality for mn(bn, x
i
n) satisfying:
mn(bn, x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
[(
qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n )
)
xjn
]
, (24)
where we use the notational convention qn(bn, x
0
n) , 0.
Proof. Lemma 3 and the IR constraint mn(bn, x
1
n) ≤ qn(bn, x1n)x1n easily imply:
mn(bn, x
i
n) ≤
i∑
j=1
[(
qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n )
)
xjn
]
, (25)
where qn(bn, x
0
n) , 0. Using (25),
E [mn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] =
Kn∑
i=1
p(xin|bn)mn(bn, xin),
≤
Kn∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
[(
qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n )
)
xjnp(x
i
n|bn)
]
,
=
Kn∑
j=1
Kn∑
i=j
[(
qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n )
)
xjnp(x
i
n|bn)
]
,
=
Kn∑
j=1

(qn(bn, xjn)− qn(bn, xj−1n ))

Kn∑
i=j
p(xin|bn)

xjn

 ,
=
Kn∑
j=1
p(xjn|bn)qn(bn, xjn)wn(bn, xjn),
= E [qn(bn,Xn)wn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] .
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where the second last equality is obtained by rearranging the terms and using (12). It is straight-
forward to verify that the above holds with equality for mn(bn, x
i
n) given by (24). The final step is
show that this particular choice of mn satisfies the relaxed IC and the IR constraints. The relaxed
IC constraint is trivially satisfied using Lemma 3. The IR constraint is satisfied since:
mn(bn, x
i
n) =
i∑
j=1
(qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n ))xjn,
≤
i∑
j=1
(
qn(bn, x
j
n)− qn(bn, xj−1n )
)
xin = qn(bn, x
i
n)x
i
n.
Notice that the last part of the proof of Lemma 4 shows that the condition qn(bn, x
i
n) ≤
qn(bn, x
i+1
n ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1, is also sufficient for the existence of a payment rule satisfying
the relaxed IC and the IR constraint. Proposition 1 easily follows by combining Lemmas 2-4, and
noticing that:
E [Mn(Y)] = E [mn(Yn)] = E [E [mn(Bn,Xn)|Bn]] =
∑
bn∈Bn
p(bn)E [mn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] .
B Proof of Proposition 2
To prove (18), it is sufficient to show that:
E [qn(Yn)wn(Yn)] ≤ E [qn(Yn)wn(Yn)] . (26)
We have:
E [qn(Yn)wn(Yn)] =
∑
bn∈Bn
p(bn)E [qn(bn,Xn)wn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] . (27)
Using (16), we can write:
E [qn(bn,Xn)wn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn]
=
Kn∑
i=1
p(xin|bn)qn(bn, xin)wn(bn, xin),
=
Kn∑
i=1
p(xin|bn)qn(bn, xin)
(
hbn,in − hbn,i−1n
gbn,in − gbn,i−1n
)
,
=
Kn∑
i=1
qn(bn, x
i
n)(h
bn,i
n − hbn,i−1n ),
= hbn,Knn qn(bn, x
Kn
n )− hbn,0n qn(bn, x1n)−
Kn−1∑
i=1
hbn,in (qn(bn, x
i+1
n )− qn(bn, xin)). (28)
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Similarly,
E [qn(bn,Xn)wn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn]
= h
bn,Kn
n qn(bn, x
Kn
n )− hbn,0n qn(bn, x1n)−
Kn−1∑
i=1
h
bn,i
n (qn(bn, x
i+1
n )− qn(bn, xin)). (29)
Since h
bn,i
n is the point corresponding to g
bn,i
n on the convex hull of [(g
bn,i
n , h
bn,i
n )]1≤i≤Kn , we must
have hbn,0n = h
bn,0
n , h
bn,Kn
n = h
bn,Kn
n , and h
bn,i
n ≥ hbn,in . This, along with qn(bn, xi+1n ) ≥ qn(bn, xin),
and (28)-(29), gives:
E [qn(bn,Xn)wn(bn,Xn)− qn(bn,Xn)wn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn]
= −
Kn−1∑
i=1
(hbn,in − hbn,in )(qn(bn, xi+1n )− qn(bn, xin)) ≤ 0,
hence proving (26), and in turn, the inequality (18).
Let pi be the allocation rule that maximizes
∑N
n=1Qn(b,v)wn(bn, vn) for each bid vector (b,v),
subject to the FA constraint. Given bn, if 0 ≤ i < j ≤ Kn are such that hbn,in = hbn,in , hbn,kn > hbn,kn
for i + 1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1, and hbn,jn = hbn,jn (recall that hbn,in ≥ hbn,in ), then hbn,kn lies on the line
joining (gbn,in , h
bn,i
n ) and (g
bn,j
n , h
bn,j
n ). Hence, wn(bn, x
l
n) = wn(bn, x
l+1
n ) for i+ 1 ≤ l ≤ j; i.e., wn is
constant in this interval. This in turn implies that if A ∈ 2N such that n ∈ A, then piA(b, xln,v−n)
is constant in the interval i + 1 ≤ l ≤ j, given b and v−n. Let Qn and qn be obtained from pi
by (2) and (4). Then qn(bn, x
l
n) is also constant in the interval i + 1 ≤ l ≤ j. Moreover, from the
construction of wn,
j∑
l=i+1
p(xln|bn)wn(bn, xln) =
j∑
l=i+1
p(xln|bn)wn(bn, xln),
⇒
j∑
l=i+1
p(xln|bn)wn(bn, xln)qn(bn, xln) =
j∑
l=i+1
p(xln|bn)wn(bn, xln)qn(bn, xln).
Thus, for all n ∈ N and bn, we have:
E [wn(bn,Xn)qn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] = E [wn(bn,Xn)qn(bn,Xn)|Bn = bn] ,
⇒ E [qn(Yn)wn(Yn)] = E [qn(Yn)wn(Yn)] , (30)
where the last equality follows from (27). This completes the proof of the equality.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Define FXn|bn(z) , P [Xn < z|Bn = bn]. Notice that this is the left continuous cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of the conditional random variable (Xn|Bn = bn). We start with the following
lemmas:
Lemma 5. For all n ∈ N and bn, wn(bn, xin) < xin for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1, and wn(bn, xKnn ) = xKnn .
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Proof. If wn(bn, x
i
n) = wn(bn, x
i
n), then this is trivially true. Given bn, if 0 ≤ i < j ≤ Kn are
such that hbn,in = h
bn,i
n , h
bn,k
n > h
bn,k
n for i + 1 ≤ k ≤ j − 1, and hbn,jn = hbn,jn , then wn(bn, xkn)
is constant in the interval i + 1 ≤ k ≤ j. Hence, wn(bn, xkn) = wn(bn, xi+1n ) < wn(bn, xi+1n ) <
xi+1n < x
k
n. This completes the proof of inequality. Also, wn(bn, x
Kn
n ) = x
Kn
n > wn(bn, x
i
n), for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Thus, the convex hull of points [(gbn,in , hbn,in )]1≤i≤Kn always contains the line
connecting (gbn,Kn−1n , h
bn,Kn−1
n ) to (g
bn,Kn
n , h
bn,Kn
n ) (recall the construction of wn in Section 3.2).
Hence, wn(bn, x
Kn
n ) = wn(bn, x
Kn
n ) = x
Kn
n , and the proof is complete.
Lemma 6. For all n ∈ N , bn, and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1,
wn(bn, x
i
n) = argmin
c<xin
max
z∈[x1n,x
Kn
n ]
(z − c)(1 − FXn|bn(z))
xin − c
, (31)
with the convention that if more than one value of c minimizes the maximum, then the largest
such c is selected.
Proof. From (15), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn,
(gbn,i−1n , h
bn,i−1
n ) =
(
FXn|bn(x
i
n),−xin(1− FXn|bn(xin)
)
. (32)
Let I(z) ,
(
FXn|bn(z),−z(1 − FXn|bn(z)
)
for z ∈ [x1n, xKnn ]. Consider the plot of points I(z)’s.
The convex hull of the points [I(z)]
z∈[x1n,x
Kn
n ]
is same as that of the points [(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn−1.
Note that, from the proof of Lemma 5, the convex hulls of the points [(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn−1 and
[(gbn,in , h
bn,i
n )]0≤i≤Kn differ from each other by just the line segment connecting (g
bn,Kn−1
n , h
bn,Kn−1
n )
to (gbn,Knn , h
bn,Kn
n ). Hence, wn(bn, x
i
n)’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn− 1 are obtained as the slopes of the convex
hull of points I(z)’s. Fix xin for some 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Call the line from (0,−xin) to (1, 0) the line
for xin. Given z and c < x
i
n, consider the line through the point I(z) with slope c, and let J be the
point of intersection of this line with the line for xin. Then, (z − c)(1 − FXn|bn(z))/(xin − c) is the
horizontal distance of J from the vertical line at (1, 0). Taking the maximum over z corresponds to
the point Jc which is the intersection of the line of slope c that is tangent to the plot, and the line
for xin. Then the minimizing c is the slope of the tangent at the point J
∗ where the convex hull of
I(z) intersects the line for xin, and hence, same as wn(bn, x
i
n). If there is more than one intersection
point, the largest is selected. From Lemma 5, the minimum is achieved by c < xin. This completes
the proof.
For c < xKnn , define:
ΦXn|bn(c) , max
z∈[x1n,x
Kn
n ]
(z − c)(1− FXn|bn(z)).
Notice that ΦXn|bn(c) is nonincreasing in c.
Lemma 7. Let s, t ∈ Bn be such that s ⊆ t. Then under Assumption 1, ΦXn|s(c)/ΦXn|t(c) is
nonincreasing in c.
Proof. Fix c1 < c2 < x
Kn
n . We need to prove that:
ΦXn|s(c1)
ΦXn|t(c1)
≤ ΦXn|s(c2)
ΦXn|t(c2)
.
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Under Assumption 1, (1 − FXn|s(z))/(1 − FXn|t(z)) is nonincreasing in z. Let zt1 and zs2 denote
the values of z achieving the maximum in the definition of ΦXn|t(c1) and ΦXn|s(c2) respectively.
Clearly, zt1 > c1 and z
s
2 > c2. If z
t
1 ≤ zs2,
ΦXn|s(c1)
ΦXn|t(c1)
≥ (z
t
1 − c1)(1− FXn|s(zt1))
(zt1 − c1)(1− FXn|t(zt1))
=
1− FXn|s(zt1)
1− FXn|t(zt1)
≥ 1− FXn|s(z
s
2)
1− FXn|t(zs2)
=
(zs2 − c2)(1− FXn|s(zs2))
(zs2 − c2)(1 − FXn|t(zs2))
≥ ΦXn|s(c2)
ΦXn|t(c2)
,
On the other hand, if zt1 ≥ zs2,
ΦXn|s(c1)
ΦXn|t(c1)
≥ (z
s
2 − c1)(1− FXn|s(zs2))
(zt1 − c1)(1− FXn|t(zt1))
≥ (z
s
2 − c2)(1 − FXn|s(zs2))
(zt1 − c2)(1− FXn|t(zt1))
≥ ΦXn|s(c2)
ΦXn|t(c2)
.
In either case, the required inequality is proved.
Combining Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, for any c ≤ wn(t, xin), and 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1,
ΦXn|s(c)
xin − c
≥ ΦXn|t(c)ΦXn|s(wn(t, x
i
n))
(xin − c)ΦXn|t(wn(t, xin))
≥ ΦXn|t(w(t, x
i
n))ΦXn|s(w(t, x
i
n))
(xin − w(t, xin))ΦXn|t(w(t, xin))
=
ΦXn|s(w(t, x
i
n))
xin − w(t, xin)
,
where the first inequality is by Lemma 7, and the second is because ΦXn|bn(c) is nonincreasing
in c. Hence, from Lemma 6, it follows that wn(s, x
i
n) ≥ wn(t, xin) for 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn − 1. Also
wn(s, x
Kn
n ) = wn(t, x
Kn
n ) = x
Kn
n . This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
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